Plotting out the Endgame in Venezuela
Gauging likely scenarios amid the building American threats to Venezuelan president Nicolás Maduro
The Trump administration has been dialing up pressure on Venezuelan president Nicolás Maduro in recent months. The administration cut off negotiations and dialogue with the Maduro regime last month and then ramped up an aggressive and legally dubious campaign of airstrikes against alleged drug trafficking boats off Venezuela’s coast (which I wrote about in a prior post here). It posted a $50 million bounty for information that could be used to arrest President Maduro. Meanwhile, it has positioned some 15,000 US troops and the Navy’s largest aircraft carrier off the Venezuelan coast – constituting the largest military buildup in the region since a 1994 effort to topple Haiti’s president. And recently, Trump authorized on-the-ground covert CIA action within the country. Things are coming to a head.
What is the endgame of all this? As a longtime observer and writer on Venezuelan politics, having conducted academic research in the country and published both academic and opinion pieces on it in the New York Times, The Atlantic, Foreign Policy, and elsewhere, I have been watching this closely. Below I lay out the main scenarios that have been offered by the Trump administration, the press, and others, and explain why I think that many of these are rather unlikely. I then offer two more plausible scenarios.
Maduro Steps Down Under Pressure
The Trump administration has long hoped that it could coax Maduro to step down from office. The problem, as I’ve written, is that Maduro faces a what is known as a punishment dilemma: he has been indicted in US courts and is implicated in human rights abuses and drug trafficking. Once he steps down, there is nothing preventing him from facing prosecution. He has no golden parachute option in which he can be easily ferried to a safe-haven country and live out his days sipping martinis. (The only plausible options, say like Russia, would make the current military buildup and rhetoric appear empty.) More likely, he would end up like Panama’s Manuel Noriega, who lived out his days in an American prison. As the Trump administration ratchets up the threats against Maduro, it ironically provides ever greater incentives for him to dig in.
Odds: Unlikely
Venezuela’s Military Command Turns on Maduro
If Maduro won’t step down on his own, there has been widespread speculation that Venezuela’s top military brass could turn on Maduro. That was part of the logic for the Department of Justice in ratcheting up the bounty on Maduro’s head. The problem, however, is that Maduro’s generals are in much the same boat as Maduro himself. They too have been indicted in US courts and are complicit in human rights abuses and drug trafficking. The recent designation of the Cartel de los Soles – ostensibly comprised of top regime officials – as a foreign terrorist organization only reinforces and legitimates their concerns that they cannot walk free even if they turn on Maduro.
Maduro has also tried to coup-proof his administration by adding in Cuban bodyguards and intelligence officials to keep a check on his generals. The generals are being watched and they know it.
Odds: Unlikely
Military Strikes or a Covert CIA Operation Captures Maduro
The Trump administration seems to have taken the easier options above off the table with its threats and pressure campaign. Many observers now anticipate limited military strikes against Venezuela or a covert CIA operation. That’s not entirely out of the question. The current military buildup is not enough to forcibly occupy Venezuela, and I don’t see the appetite in the administration to put many – if any – American boots on the ground. But it may try to pick a couple of targets within the country to further ratchet up pressure on Maduro. The problem is, that’s not going to encourage him to step down any more than other pressure campaigns given that his future in this scenario is bleak. So it’s not clear what a limited strike campaign could really accomplish, other than serving as a PR operation to American audiences interested in going after drug trafficking organizations.
A special operations CIA mission could also try to disrupt the Maduro regime and even capture Maduro. After all, the US successfully captured Panama’s Manuel Noriega in 1989 and dragged him to US justice. That’s possible, but it’s risky. And the Maduro regime has had plenty of time to prepare for it.
Odds: Possible, but may not succeed
The US Military Buildup Quietly Disperses
In important ways, the Trump administration has backed itself into a corner. Its publicly stated goals aren’t likely to be met. And it is well known that Trump’s attention span is limited. Perhaps as it realizes that Maduro and his cronies won’t fold, the military troops and assets will quietly disperse. A well-timed crisis elsewhere could give it cover to do so.
The problem here is that the US military would look like it is simply backing down. The military doesn’t like issuing threats that prove empty. Furthermore, Secretary of State Marco Rubio is a key player in all of this. The son of Cuban immigrants and a former senator from Florida, where Cuban and Venezuelan migrants have gathered in large number, Rubio truly despises the Maduro regime and doesn’t want to back down. His future political fortunes could also turn on the results of the current situation.
Odds: Unlikely
There is a Lower-Ranking Military Coup
With Venezuela’s top generals dug in, the likelihood of a high-level military coup is slim. But Venezuela’s history is rife with coups and coup attempts by lower-ranking officers. Second-tier and regional officers are far less likely to themselves be indicted in foreign courts or implicated in human rights abuses or other crimes. They don’t face the punishment dilemma: if Maduro is toppled, they could be viewed and treated as heroes by an incoming regime (likely a transitional one led by opposition leader María Corina Machado). Of course, lower-ranking officers face a collective action problem. It’s hard to gather enough of them together at the same time to project a sense of a fait accompli to other military members, leading the balance of the military to tip in their favor. Others have tried under Maduro and failed. Even so, if the American military and CIA are worth their reputation, it’s hard to imagine they’re not trying to work on this as an option. It wouldn’t be easy, but it would deliver the biggest “victory”.
Odds: Possible
The Trump Administration Strikes a Limited Deal with Maduro and Claims Victory
Despite the Trump administration’s shrill rhetoric against Maduro, Trump has also indicated that he’s open to talking and negotiating with him. That presents the possibility of a deal short of removing Maduro from office. What would the Trump administration accept at this point, however, having staked out a maximalist position that it wants Maduro out? It turns out, there is a fair amount on the table. Trump would want a win on several issues of core concern to his political brand, most likely including a promise to take back in large numbers of recent Venezuelan immigrants to the US, to crack down on drug trafficking organizations, and to get a share of Venezuela’s oil resources to boot. Trump could try to sell a rather weak crackdown on traffickers to the American public through the handover of some number of Venezuelans implicated in trafficking (whether true or not so much – e.g., some members of Tren de Aragua that could be billed as high-profile). That still leaves the sticky issue of what happens with Maduro after having effectively labeled his government as a foreign terrorist organization. Maduro would probably have to yet again pledge to hold free and fair elections. Trump could push that out several years and give Maduro a chance to refashion his image in the meantime, or even push it to the next administration.
There are variants on this sort of a limited deal. But it would allow the Trump administration to claim a victory, at which point it could mostly pack up and move along. That could be sufficiently attractive to Trump, even if it may not satisfy Rubio. And Maduro could be convinced to do that deal as well. It would take time to hash out a lot of details, but even so, it’s imaginable.
Odds: Possible
Leading image is the aircraft carrier USS Gerald Ford, the US military’s largest warship that is now positioned off the coast of Venezuela. CC license PDM 1.0.